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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\VARRE~ IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, a corporation, Appellan,t, 
vs. 
)lILTOX T. BRO\VN and 
FLORENCE H. BRO\VN, his wife, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
12620 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
'fhe defendants seek affirmance of the judgment 
of the trial court principally on two grounds, ( ~) . r~s 
judica ta and ( 2) lapse of time h~s barre~ the pla1~tiff s 
right to relief. These points will be discussed m the 
order stated. 
1 
1. RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION TO 
THIS CASE. 
The law relating to res judicata is only partially 
stated in the respondent's brief. It is pointed out that 
" ... the principles of res judicata apply not only to 
issues which were raised and litigated, but also to alJ 
issues which could have been raised." (Res. br. p. 14) 
The law is that where the causes of action differ, 
res judicata is a bar only to the extent that the earlier 
judgment actually raised and decided the same points 
and issues which were raised in the later case. 'Ve 
quote from the case of East :Mill Creek 'Vater Co. v. 
Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P2d 863, cited by 
defendants (Res. br. p. 14) continuing from the end 
of the portion of the opinion quoted by defendants: 
"On the other hand where the claim, demand 
or cause of action is different in the two cases 
then the former is res judicata of the latter only 
to the extent that the former actually raised and 
decided the same points and issues which are 
raised in the latter. Harding Company v. Hard-
ing, 352 Ill. 417 186 N.E. 152 (and other cases) 
. . . This distinction has been fallowed by this 
court although not expressly pointed out. (Cit-
ing many cases) " 
This is in accord with the general law. 
50 CJS, p. 174 
l\Iatters which have not been expressly, im· 
pliedly, or necessarily determined are not con-
2 
eluded by the judgment in a prior suit between 
the parties, and where the second case is on a 
different cause of action the prior judgment is 
res judicata or operates as an estoppe1 only as 
to matters actually litigated and determined. 
The true test of the conclusiveness of a farmer 
judgment with respect to particular matters is the 
identity of issues. The adjudication of an issue in the 
first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and 
distinct issue arising in the second. 
50 CJS pp. 198-200 
.:\Iatters not in issue or necessarily involved in an 
action, particularly matters which involve facts or rights 
accruing after rendition of the judgment are not con-
cluded in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action. 
50 CJS p. 218 
An adjudication as to the construction of a contract 
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
provided the particular question was actually or neces-
sarily determined. 
50 CJS p. 237 
\Ve shall apply the principles discussed above to 
the facts of this case. The defendants claim that the 
issues framed by the pleadings in this case were, or 
might have been, determined in the case of Lyman 
Skeen v. \Varren Irrigation o., No. 4677, which resulted 
in the stipulated decree dated November 10, 1914 and 
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by an order dated February 5, 1938 after a hearing on 
an order to show cause. 
A review of the tile in Case :X o. 4677 and the 19U 
decree indicates that although, (as in the East Mill 
Creek case, supra,) the same instruments were involved 
in No. 4677 as in the present case, the causes of action 
were different and the issues decided were different. 
See the Amended Complaint in Exhibit L., Case No. 
4677, which is a suit by Lyman Skeen to restrain the 
\Varren Irrigation Company from cutting down the 
period of use of water due Lyman Skeen under the 
exchange agreement evidenced by the 1903 and 1904 
deeds from 110 hours of water to 48 hours of water. 
The only issues determined by the stipulation and 
decree based thereon were: 
1. That 5 second feet of water would be delivered 
under the 1903 deed every 14 days for a period of 48 
hours during the months of April, May and June, be-
ginning in 1915 in lieu of delivery as provided by the 
decree (which was for a delivery of a constant flow 
for 110 acres on the basis of one second foot for 150 
acres) , and for reduction of the flow right to 4 second 
feet during the months of July, August and September. 
,2. That the sources of the Lyman Skeen \\Tater 
were " . . . the natural sources of supply exclusive of 
its said pumping plant." 
3. The sum of $33.00 shall be paid each year " .. · 
in full for the water supplied and furnished." (Em-
phasis added). 
The order to show cause which resulted in the 1938 
order presented the issue as to whether on August 9, 
1937 there was water available from natural sources 
of supply for delivery to the petitioner of four second 
feet of waetr as provided by the 1914 decree. The court 
found that the water was so availabile, that the de-
fendant and its officers were mistaken in their belief 
that the water was not available and that they were 
acting in good faith and were not wilfully intending to 
violate tht 1914 decree. The only judgment entered was 
for $54.30 which represented the cost of measuring the 
water and costs of the court. 
The issues in the present case include: 
( 1 ) Whether the exchange of water rights was 
terminated by the happening in 1969 of the condition 
subsequent in the 1904 deed. 
( 2) Whether the defendants were obligated to pay 
their share of expenses of operation and maintenance 
of the canal. 
( 3) Whether the defendants can irrigate land out-
side of the area described in the 1903 deed. 
( 4) Whether the defendants' water right has a 
priority superior to the plaintiff's right. 
( 5) 'Vhether all water awarded by the 1903 deed 
as modified by the 1914 decree can be beneficially used 
on the defendants' 50 acres of land. 
( 6) \Vhether the defendants can have the be~e~t 
without cost to them of diversion, storage and d1str1-
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bution facilities constructed by the plaintiff at great 
expense since February 11, 1903. 
It is apparent from the above summary that this 
suit states a different cause of action and raises issues 
which were not litigated or decided by either the 1914 
decree or the 1938 order. The 1914 decree simply 
changed the method of delivery of water from a con-
stant flow of less than one second foot to a much larger 
flow for 48 hours every 14 days and restricted the source 
of water to "natural sources of supply'' exclusive of 
pumped water. The 1969 willful refusal to deliver 
water under the 1903 deed had not happened in 1914 
and 1938 and could not have been litigated. There was 
no issue before the court in either case, ( 1) as to pay-
ment of operation and maintenance costs in addition 
to $33.00 for the water, ( 2) as to whether the restric-
tion as to place of use described in the 1903 deed could 
be enforced, ( 3) as to the relative priorities of the water 
rights of the plaintiff and defendants, and ( 4) as to 
whether the defendants were entitled, without cost, or 
expense to the benefit of improvements constructed by 
the plaintiff since 1945 at costs, exceeding $80,000.00. 
This latter issue obviously could not have been litigated 
many years before the expenditures were made. 
The 1938 order based on the findings of fact recited 
therein determined that the petitioners were successors 
to Lvman Skeen; that they were entitled to water de-
livertes in accordance with the 1914 decree and that 
when the petition was filed in August, 1937, they were 
entitled to water from the natural supply, but there 
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were no issues pleaded or decided as to events which 
involved the construction of the 1903 and 1904 deeds 
' or the other issues pleaded in the present case. 
It is clear under the rules of law stated above that 
the court erred in finding and decreeing that all issues 
raised in the present case were adjudicated in the 1914 
and 1938 proceedings. 
2. LAPSE OF TIME HAS NOT BARRED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELIEF. 
It was found by the trial court and argued at 
length in the respondent's brief that because of the long 
period of time since the 1903 and 1904 deeds, the 1914 
decree and the 1938 order, the rights of the parties as 
to the amount of annual assessments, the place of use 
of water, and the sources of water delivered, the rights 
of the parties have become fixed and cannot now be 
disturbed. 
This argument completely ignores the language 
in the 1904 deed, " ... and no length of time shall vary 
their part of this agreement." (See p. 33, App's. hr.), 
which follows the provision that " ... in case the Utah 
Light & Ra ilway Company or its grantor, the Pioneer 
Electric Power Company or any of its or their assigns 
or successors in interest, shall willfully ref use to carry 
out the agreement-then the grant of the water right 
shall cease and determine . . . " 
The law is that where the language of a condition 
subsequent is clear and specific it will be enforced. 
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Houghton v. Socony Oil Co., 2:n CA 2d 188 
41 Cal. Rptr. 714 ' 
Alamo School District v. Jones, 182 CA 2d 180 
6 Cal. Rptr. 272 ' 
Rosecrans v. Pacific .Electric Ry. Co., 21 Cal. 
2d 602, 134 P2d 245. 
\\' ithout waiving our position that the enforcement 
of the pro,·isions in the 1904 deed restores the parties 
to their original positions, we wish to discuss further 
reasons why the lapse of time has had no significance. 
The law relating to changes of place of use as set 
out in Section 8, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919 
requiring changes only after tiling an application with 
the state engineer, is perfectly clear and the fact that it 
has been violated for many years does not legalize such 
violation. The trial court completely ignored this statute. 
As pointed out in the appellant's brief ( p. 6) since 
1945 the plaintiff spent more than $80,000.00 improving 
its distribution system of which more than $73,000.00 
has been spent since 1962. The defendants' argument 
that circumstances have not changed with reference 
to annual assessments for the last 62 years is simply 
contrarv to the facts. If the defendants' argument that 
the 19i4 decree supersedes the 1903 deed which pro-
vided, 
"Said water to he f umished from now existing 
rights ... ", 
that the only restriction now is from "natural sources 
of supply"' (except pumping), and that the annual 
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assessment is $33.00 which by long lapse of time is 
?inding regardless of circumstances, is sustained, it 
1.s o~vious that there has been and will be a gross in-
Jushce. The defendants will succeed in getting for 
practically nothing the great benefit of payment of 
assessments of from $2.00 to $7.00 per share since 1929. 
The defendants if they had been carrying their share of 
the load would have been paying $220.00 to $770.00 
annually since that date. 
The issues relating to the question as to whether 
the defendants should pay operation and maintenance 
expenses if they are to get the full benefit of the great 
improvements in the distribution system in the 1960's 
are new issues, and there has obviously been no long 
lapse of time before raising them. 
It should be pointed out that on page 28 of the 
transcript the defendants, through their attorney, stipu-
lated that they had no interest in water which has become 
available after 1903 by purchase or improvements or 
otherwise. This stipulation is acknowledged in the 
respondents' brief, pages 25-26, but is not incorporated 
into the findings and decree in this case. This was mani-
fest error. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decree in this 
case should be reversed and the trial court should be 
directed to enter a decree for the plaintiffs restoring 
the parties to the water rights as they existed bef~re 
the 1903-1904 exchange of water rights. If such relief 
is not granted the present decree should be modified to 
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enforce the provisions of the 1903 deed as changed by 
the 1914 decree and to grant to the plaintiff the equit-
able relief as prayed. 
SKEEN AND SKEEN 
E. J. Skeen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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